Empire Cricket Booklet

BERNARD HALL, RICHARD PARRY AND JONTY INCi I

Following the Jameson Raid fiasco, the Afrikaner Bond withdrew its support for Rhodes, but the imperial government continued to play a complicated game in undermining the Afrikaner control over their republics. By the end of the nineteenth century, Joseph Chamberlain's appointment of Alfred Milner as high commissioner had propelled Britain towards a war that President M. T. Steyn of the Orange Free State tried to avert through arranging a meeting at Bloemfontein in May 1899. 'In Bloemfontein,' wrote Grundlingh, 'two worlds had passed each other by: that of the sophisticated imperialistic Milner who increasingly wanted a confrontation, and that of the unaffected, nationalistic Kruger who preferred peace, but not peace at any price.' 27 Steyn and Paul Kruger realised that the British were set on war and that it was to their advantage to attack first before the arrival of British reinforcements. Views on the causes of the war have changed over the years and are no longer simply based on the franchise issue, the 'increasing American and German competition' or the 'uncertainty over the British gold reserves'. They have taken into account that imperial statesmen in the 'tense' 1890s were unable 'to run the risk of the future of the South African mining industry being threatened by a regime which, justly or unjustly, was not, according to imperial views, capable in the long run of guaranteeing the interests of the mining industry'. 28 Thomas Pakenham went further in stating that 'what was at stake was Britain's right to be the paramount power in South Africa. The Boers had challenged this, not only by their obstinacy in negotiations, but by recklessly asking Britain to commit itself not to intervene in future in the affairs of the Transvaal.' 29 T. R. H. Davenport adds weight to this interpretation in claiming the war 'was fought to determine which white power held real power in South Africa'. 30 The British public had expected the fighting to be over by Christmas. It was the longest (almost three years), the costliest (over £200 million), the bloodiest (at least 22 000 British, 34 000 Boer and 15 000 black lives), and the most humiliating war for Britain between 1815 and 1914. 'The War,' said Packenham, 'had given the British, in Kipling's phrase, an "imperial lesson".' 31

north and efforts to secure a route to the sea. Then, in 1895, he stepped up his pursuit of a political federation and sought an opportunity to intervene in the Republic. The men who had come to dig for gold - the uitlanders - expressed apparent frustration at their lack of access to political power and Rhodes worked on a scheme whereby a rising on the Rand would lead to the British annexing the Republic. Dr L. S. Jameson - described as 'a mixture of imperialist idealism and swelled head' - was asked to raise a volunteer force in Bulawayo and be on the alert to support the rising. 24 Rhodes negotiated a grant of land through the Bechuanaland Protectorate for the proposed railway route to Rhodesia. It ran close to the Transvaal border and was therefore suitably positioned to serve as a base for Jameson's secret invasion. A force was raised and welcomed as a move towards greater security in Rhodesia, and volunteers did not suspect a hidden agenda. On 29 December 1895, the raiders assembled and were addressed by the Hon. Charles Coventry who had played in the Tests for Warton's team against South Africa in 1888/89. He told his men: 'We are going straight to Johannesburg. We want you all to come. It will be a short trip, everything has been arranged.' 25 The expedition was a disaster from the outset and Jameson and his men were compelled to surrender at Doornkop, near Krugersdorp. In Bulawayo, the Rhodesia Horse Volunteers were alerted. There was tremendous excitement, and the first-ever cricket matches being played between Bulawayo and Salisbury were affected. Hemy Taberer (later to become South Africa's cricket captain) found to his disgust that he was without three of his players because they were busy trying to emol in the force which was to follow and support the raiders. Taberer brooded over the unsatisfactory conclusion to the historic cricket visit to Bulawayo and was not drawn into the euphoric support for Jameson. He provided a hint of his feelings in a tense after-match meeting with one of the cricket deserters, Orlando Baragwanath. Incensed that the people of Salisbury had been let down, Taberer did not mince his words. 'Baragwanath,' he was reported to have said, 'we would have played cricket if Jameson had invaded heaven.' 26